The project aims to intervene in the heart of the vexed question of the relationship between perception and concepts and to take a stand in the battle between conceptualists and non-conceptualists. By employing the philosophical instruments of Classical Phenomenology, the project aims to overcome the dispute by offering the new notion of typified praxis, thanks to which the nature of concepts will be explained in the light of our worldly practical experience, which varies according to our habits and cultural environment.

Since the McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, scholars have become increasingly interested in identifying the relationship between concepts and perceptions. The debate on conceptualism has mostly overlooked whether it is possible to account for a third path between conceptualism and non-conceptualism capable of rethinking the nature of conceptual content within the horizon of worldly habits and cultural experience. In discussing the articulation between the conceptual and perceptual dimensions of experience, scholars have mostly neglected to exploit three elements that this project considers as closely interconnected:1) Husserl’s notion of Typus and 2) Heidegger’s notion of praxis as useful tools to overcome the division between concepts and perceptions, and 3) the role of habits within the question of conceptualism. Both the notion of Typus and praxis are forms of experience that reframe the question of conceptuality by placing it in the context of our habitual world as that horizon in which concepts emerge and interlace perception. The project intends to address the question concerning the nature of concepts by bringing forward the idea of a typified praxis as a renovated account of the understanding of conceptual content able to overcome the intellectualistic and representational conception of concepts and showing how their nature should be thought of as intertwined with perception and dependent from our habitual, practical and cultural dealings.